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Abstract—Autonomous driving has been the subject of in-
creased interest in recent years both in industry and in academia.
Serious efforts are being pursued to address legal, technical and
logistical problems and make autonomous cars a viable option
for everyday transportation. One significant challenge is the time
and effort required for the verification and validation of the
decision and control algorithms employed in these vehicles to
ensure a safe and comfortable driving experience. Hundreds of
thousands of miles of driving tests are required to achieve a
well calibrated control system that is capable of operating an
autonomous vehicle in an uncertain traffic environment where
multiple interactions between vehicles and drivers simultaneously
occur. Traffic simulators where these interactions can be modeled
and represented with reasonable fidelity can help decrease the
time and effort necessary for the development of the autonomous
driving control algorithms by providing a venue where acceptable
initial control calibrations can be achieved quickly and safely
before actual road tests. In this paper, we present a game-
theoretic traffic model that can be used to 1) test and compare
various autonomous vehicle decision and control systems and
2) calibrate the parameters of an existing control system. We
demonstrate two example case studies, where, in the first case, we
test and quantitatively compare two autonomous vehicle control
systems in terms of their safety and performance, and, in the
second case, we optimize the parameters of an autonomous
vehicle control system, utilizing the proposed traffic model and
simulation environment.
Index Terms—Game Theory, Reinforcement Learning, Traffic
Modeling, Autonomous Vehicles, Verification and Validation
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE of the most significant challenges that must beaddressed before autonomous cars can be deployed in
mass production is the Verification and Validation (V&V) of
their control systems in terms of safety and performance [1],
[2]. It has been estimated that autonomous vehicles need to
be driven 275 million miles without fatality to assure the
same rate of reliability as existing human driven cars [3].
Hence testing and calibration of decision and control systems
of autonomous vehicles in simulation becomes necessary to
N. Li, D. Oyler, M. Zhang, I. Kolmanovsky, and A. Girard are with the
Department of Aerospace Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
MI, 48109 USA.
Y. Yildiz is with the Department of Mechanical Engineering, Bilkent
University, 06800 Cankaya, Ankara, Turkey.
Ilya Kolmanovsky and Nan Li acknowledge the support for this research
of the National Science Foundation under Award Number CNS 1544844 to
the University of Michigan.
Anouck Girard acknowledges the support for this research of the Air Force
Research Laboratory grant FA 8650-07-2-3744 to the University of Michigan.
complement the on-the-road tests and the formal methods-
based and reachability analysis-based procedures (e.g., see [4],
[5], [6], [7]).
One common approach to the design of control systems
for autonomous vehicles is to utilize a hierarchical control
structure, wherein a higher level outer loop controller gen-
erates reference trajectories for the lower level inner loop
controller which, in turn, determines the steering angle and
acceleration/deceleration inputs required to follow the ref-
erence trajectory [8]. Designing these control systems is a
challenging task as they need to provide a safe ride together
with an acceptable performance and comfort in an uncertain
traffic environment. Uncertainties generally emanate from un-
predictable behaviors of other drivers, pedestrians, unexpected
obstacles, and changing road and weather conditions. Several
control approaches have been proposed for autonomous vehi-
cles including decision trees [9], [10], Partially Observable
Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) [11] and methods
based on multi-policy decision making [12], that are mainly
employed as outer loop controllers. For the inner loop, one of
the most common approaches is based on Model Predictive
Control (MPC) [13]-[14].
Note that advanced driver behavioral models may also be
used in the outer loop [15], [16], with the motivation that an
autonomous vehicle should be able to drive at least as well
as a human driver. In fact, some experts have suggested that
autonomous vehicles should be permitted on public roads only
after it is proven that they are superior to human drivers [2].
Simulators can facilitate the development and testing of
autonomous vehicle control algorithms, complementing the
road tests. Since autonomous vehicles will be interacting with
human driven vehicles in traffic, such simulators need to reflect
driver and vehicle interactions. Several methods have been
proposed in the literature to address this problem. In [17] and
[18], a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based driver model is
proposed based on real driving data. In [19] and [20], k-means
clustering is used to determine the driving mode and define
an approach to predicting and overbounding future vehicle
trajectories. It is shown that the performance of an assisted
driving algorithm can be improved through the prediction of
driver inputs. In [21], a “cognitive architectures” approach,
which is “a computational framework that incorporates built-
in, well-tested parameters and constraints on cognitive and
perceptual-motor processes,” is utilized for driver modeling.
Built-in logical rules (if-then-else) are used to represent the
human decision making process. In [22], lane change be-
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havior of drivers is modeled using a multi agent simulation
system called “Simulation of Intelligent TRAnsport Systems
(SITRAS).” Several logical algorithms are used to model the
decision making during lane changes. The resulting actions
of the drivers are therefore predefined with strict rules even
though driver aggressiveness can be incorporated into the
model by tuning certain parameters.
With respect to the existing approaches, the present paper
is distinguished by the advanced modeling of driver and
vehicle interactions in traffic using a specific game theoretic
formulation that is scalable to multiple vehicles. The proposed
method has the following advantages: a) actions of drivers
and vehicles are determined by utilizing a decision making
process, instead of assuming that these actions are prescribed
in advance as functions of time or as functions of the state
of the system; b) multiple interactions between human driven
vehicles and autonomous vehicles can be modeled simulta-
neously and in a computationally tractable way; c) all the
vehicles in a traffic scenario are simultaneously modeled as
decision makers as opposed to predicting the decisions of
one vehicle while assuming that the rest of the vehicles
move based on certain kinematic and dynamic constraints.
The proposed game theoretic model makes it possible to
conduct a quantitative analysis of the traffic. For example,
a) the increase in the number of incidents based on the
traffic density can be assessed; b) the effect of a certain
parameter value in an autonomous vehicle control algorithm
on the safety of the vehicle, e.g., quantified by the number of
incidents, can be determined; c) various autonomous vehicle
control algorithms can be compared quantitatively in a multi-
vehicle time-extended scenario, based on certain safety and
performance metrics; and d) optimization of a cost function
that reflects safety and performance can be performed.
Our approach uniquely combines a specific game theoretic
formalism, which is used to model intelligent agent interac-
tions, and reinforcement learning, which is used to evolve
these interactions in a time-extended (multi-move) scenario.
The core ideas are synergistic with the framework of “semi
network-form games,” [23], [24] and help us obtain the proba-
ble outcomes of a complex traffic scenario driven by multiple
interactions. To the authors’ knowledge, such an approach has
not been previously exploited for automotive traffic modeling.
Other game theoretic approaches, in particular, based on
Stackelberg games, have been studied for application to ve-
hicle highway driving problems in [15] and [16]. Although
these approaches represent driver interactions in traffic using
a game theoretic setting, they do not consider dynamic (multi-
move) scenarios. The latter are considered in [25] for Hybrid
Electric Vehicle (HEV) energy management where the driver
and the powertrain are considered to be two players in a
game. However, increasing the number of players (drivers, in
our case) beyond three complicates computing a Stackelberg
solution, especially in a time-extended (multi-move) scenario.
On the other hand, the hierarchical reasoning based game
theoretic approach exploited in this paper is easily scalable.
Indeed, an implementation of the proposed approach for a 50
player game can be found in [26], and scenarios with up to
30 vehicles are handled in this paper.
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
a) we develop a novel and scalable to multiple vehicles
traffic model and simulation environment based on a specific
game theoretic modeling approach; b) our approach allows the
representation of driver interactions for many-move, many-
vehicle traffic scenarios using a computationally tractable
game theoretic approach, whereas many existing methods
consider only one-move interaction between two vehicles; c)
we demonstrate that autonomous vehicle control algorithms
can be quantitatively evaluated in our simulator and compared
based on safety and performance metrics applied to simulation
outcomes; two policies proposed in the literature serve as case
studies, while other autonomous driving algorithms could also
be easily integrated and tested; d) we provide a case study to
demonstrate that probabilistic outcomes of traffic scenarios can
be utilized to obtain the optimal calibration for an autonomous
vehicle controller.
Preliminary results have appeared in conference papers
[27], [28]. Differently from [27], [28], in this paper, a) we
incorporate a more realistic action space including harder
brakes and faster accelerations; b) we develop a more realistic
traffic model with more representative distance constraint
violation rates via improvements in the reinforcement learning
procedure; and c) we demonstrate that optimal parameter
values for an autonomous vehicle control algorithm can be
obtained using a cost function based on safety and perfor-
mance. Furthermore, this paper has additional details and
interpretations not found in our preliminary conference papers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we define
the problem being treated in this paper and the vehicle model
being used. In Section III, we present the level-k game theory
and the reinforcement learning approach to obtain the policies.
In Section IV, we introduce two autonomous vehicle control
algorithms that will be tested by our simulator. In Section V,
we describe our simulator and its implementation results.
We then summarize the key developments in our paper in
Section VI.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The problem we treat is to model the behavior of drivers
in a traffic scenario where the cars are driven on a 3-lane
highway. We later demonstrate that such models can be used
in simulators to evaluate autonomous vehicle control policies.
Fig. 1 shows an example scenario with 6 cars. Note that this
is not a restriction of the proposed method, and that scenarios
with more cars and lanes can be handled. Simulated cars are
assumed to be traveling in the same direction and to be driven
by human drivers who obey the general traffic laws.
A. Physical models
The discrete-time equations of motion for each vehicle
during forward motion and lane changes are given by
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + vx(t)∆t,
vx(t+ 1) = vx(t) + a(t)∆t, (1)
y(t+ 1) = y(t) + vy(t)∆t,
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Fig. 1: Example scenario: Traffic in a 3-lane highway.
where x, y are the vehicle longitudinal and lateral positions,
respectively, vx and vy are vehicle longitudinal and lateral ve-
locities, respectively, a(t) is the vehicle longitudinal accelera-
tion, and ∆t is the update period. The longitudinal acceleration
a(t) and the lateral velocity vy(t) are the two control inputs.
We assume that all cars accelerate and decelerate at either
±a1[m/s2] or ±a2[m/s2]. The nominal values, ±a1[m/s2], re-
flect the acceleration/deceleration a human driver would apply
in normal situations, while the hard accelerations/decelerations
of ±a2[m/s2], reflect the values used in urgent situations,
based on the maximum acceleration/deceleration capability
of a vehicle. We also assume that lane changes occur with
constant lateral velocity such that the total time to change
lanes is tcl[s]. During lane changes, the longitudinal velocity
remains constant, and once a lane change begins, it always
continues to completion.
While these assumptions represent a reasonable approxima-
tion, formulations with more acceleration/deceleration levels
can be similarly introduced at the cost of the increased time
and effort to compute the policies.
B. Observation space
In real traffic flow, a driver can neither observe nor process
all the information about all cars on the road. A human can
possibly observe and use the information he/she obtains from
the cars in a certain vicinity of their own. In particular, a
human driver can hardly measure his/her exact distances from
other cars. He/she can only estimate the distances and specify
them as “close”,“far”, etc. Therefore, we assign the following
observation space for the drivers:
1) The distance from our car to the car directly in front,
called range, quantified as “close” (distance ≤ dc[m]),
“nominal” (dc[m] < distance ≤ df [m]) or “far” (dis-
tance > df [m]),
2) The range to the car in the front left lane, quantified as
“close”, “nominal” or “far,”
3) The range to the car in the front right lane, quantified
as “close”, “nominal” or “far,”
4) The range to the car in the rear left lane, quantified as
“close”, “nominal” or “far,”
5) The range to the car in the rear right lane, quantified as
“close”, “nominal” or “far,”
6) The range rate to the car in front, quantified as “ap-
proaching” (distance decreasing), “stable” (distance not
changing), or “moving away” (distance increasing),
7) The range rate to the car in the front left lane, quantified
as “approaching”, “stable” or “moving away,”
8) The range rate to the car in the front right lane, quanti-
fied as “approaching”, “stable” or “moving away,”
9) The range rate to the car in the rear left lane, quantified
as “approaching”, “stable” or “moving away,”
10) The range rate to the car in the rear right lane, quantified
as “approaching”, “stable” or “moving away,”
11) The lane index of the car, quantified as “lane 1”, “lane
2” or “lane 3.”
Note that this description of the observation space reflects
the uncertainty (or noise) present in real life driver observation.
C. Action space
Drivers have 7 basic actions:
1) “Maintain” current lane and speed,
2) “Accelerate” at rate = a1[m/s2], provided velocity does
not exceed vmax[km/h],
3) “Decelerate” at rate = −a1[m/s2], provided velocity is
above vmin[km/h],
4) “Hard Accelerate” at rate = a2[m/s2], provided velocity
does not exceed vmax[km/h],
5) “Hard Decelerate” at rate = −a2[m/s2], provided veloc-
ity is above vmin[km/h],
6) Change lane to the left, provided there is a lane on the
left,
7) Change lane to the right, provided there is a lane on the
right.
D. Reward function
A “reward function” is a mathematical representation of the
goals of a driver. Basic goals of the drivers in real traffic are
1) to not have an accident, such as a car crash (safety), 2)
to minimize the time needed to reach the destination (perfor-
mance), 3) to keep a reasonable headway from preceding cars
(comfort) and 4) to minimize driving effort (comfort).
These goals can be reflected in the reward function given
as
R = w1c+ w2v + w3h+ w4e, (2)
where wi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, are the weights for each term
and c, v, h and e represent “constraint violation,” “velocity,”
“headway” and “effort” metrics. In particular, we define a
safe zone for each car (a rectangular area that over-bounds
the geometric contour of the car with a safety margin) whose
boundaries are treated as distance constraints to represent the
safety of the car.
The weighting terms, wi, may change depending on the
aggressiveness of the driver, but, intuitively, to avoid distance
constraint violation should be of the most importance, i.e.,
w1  w2, w3, w4. (3)
The terms, c, v, h, e, are explained below.
c (constraint violation): The term c is assigned a value of
-1 when a distance constraint violation occurs and a value of
0 otherwise.
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v (velocity): The term v is assigned the value
v =
vx − vnominal
a1
, vnominal =
vmin + vmax
2
. (4)
Here the reason for dividing by a1 is to make this term of the
same order of magnitude as the other terms, to facilitate the
choice of weights.
h (headway): The term h takes the following values de-
pending on the headway distance (the range to the car directly
in front):
h =
 −1 if headway ∈ “close,”0 if headway ∈ “nominal,”
1 if headway ∈ “far.”
(5)
e (effort): The term e takes the value 0 if the driver’s
action is “maintain,” e2 = −5 if the driver’s action is “hard
accelerate” or “hard decelerate,” and e1 = −1 otherwise.
This term discourages the driver from making unnecessary
maneuvers. In particular, a higher penalty discourages the
driver from unnecessarily applying “hard accelerate” or “hard
decelerate.” But in the case where another maneuver cannot
avoid a constraint violation, the driver would apply “hard
accelerate” or “hard decelerate” to keep safe. Note that the
ratio between e1 and e2 depends on the driver’s behavior
and could be tuned to match the driving behavior of different
human drivers.
E. Constraints
The reward function (2) already reflects the penalty for dis-
tance constraint violations, which may be viewed as imposing
soft constraints on the control. For some combinations of states
and actions that obviously lead to constraint violations, we can
also impose hard constraints to avoid the occurrence of such
combinations. In particular, we introduce the following hard
constraints, which make certain actions unavailable in certain
situations:
1) If a car in the left lane is in a parallel position, the
controlled car cannot change lane to the left,
2) If a car in the right lane is in a parallel position, the
controlled car cannot change lane to the right,
3) If a car in the left lane is “close” and “approaching,” the
controlled car cannot change lane to the left,
4) If a car in the right lane is “close” and “approaching,”
the controlled car cannot change lane to the right.
Note that two cars are assumed to be in a parallel position if
the safe zones of these two cars intersect in the longitudinal
direction. The use of these hard constrains eliminates the
clearly undesirable behaviors better than through penalizing
them in the reward function, and also increases the learning
speed during training.
III. DRIVER INTERACTION MODEL
The driver interaction model developed in this study enables
the modeling of driver-driver and driver-autonomous vehicle
interactions through the use of hierarchical decision making
and reinforcement learning. The model is a “policy,” which
is a stochastic map from the observation space of the driver
to his/her action space (see Section II). In other words, this
map assigns a probability distribution over possible actions
for every observation. Below, we explain how this model is
generated.
A. Hierarchical decision making
The developed interaction model is premised on the idea
that intelligent agents (such as drivers) have different levels of
reasoning. According to this observation, a level-0 agent does
not consider probable actions of other agents that he/she is
interacting with but rather behaves reflexively. For example, if
a driver makes a hard brake when he/she observes an obstacle
on the road, without considering how the car following behind
would react to this sudden deceleration, this behavior is
referred to as a level-0 behavior and the driver is referred to as
a level-0 driver. On the other hand, if this driver assumes that
the car following behind is being driven by a level-0 driver,
who would make a hard brake in case of an obstacle, which
may not be enough to avoid a collision, and therefore decides
to make a lane change to avoid that collision, then this driver is
referred to as a level-1 driver. Similarly, if a driver assumes that
the other drivers are level-1 and takes an action accordingly,
this driver is a level-2 driver. Higher level driver behavior can
be modeled using the same logic. A detailed explanation of
this hierarchical modeling method is given in [29] and [30].
To obtain higher level policies, one needs to start by defining
a level-0 policy. There are various ways to do this, such as
selecting each possible action with equal probability regardless
of the observation, or constructing a very simple policy, which
provides a minimally reasonable behavior for a range of
observations.
In this study, a level-0 policy is formulated as follows:
actionl0 =

“Decelerate,” if the car in front is
“nominal” and “approaching,”
or is “close” and “stable,”
“Hard Decelerate,” if the car in front is “close”
and “approaching,”
“Maintain,” otherwise.
(6)
B. Reinforcement learning to solve the Partially Observable
Markov Decision Process
The problem treated in this paper is a multi-agent deci-
sion making problem. We use a reinforcement learning (RL)
algorithm to determine the policies for each agent based
on the reward function defined in Section II-D. To achieve
the maximum reward, the RL algorithm exploits two steps
including 1) “policy evaluation,” where the state-action pairs
are assigned values based on the accumulated rewards they
gain, and 2) “policy improvement,” where the probability
of choosing the actions that have higher reward values are
increased. For more details on RL, see [31].
Conventional RL algorithms require the process to be
Markov for convergence guarantees. Note that although the
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underlying dynamics of the highway problem studied in this
work is Markov, each agent (driver) can observe only a sub-
space of the whole state space (see Section II-B) and therefore
has to solve a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(POMDP) problem. In RL literature, the observations are
commonly referred to as “messages.” In this work we employ
the Jaakkola RL algorithm [32], which distinguishes itself
from conventional approaches by guaranteeing to converge
at least to a local maximum in terms of average rewards,
when the problem is of POMDP type. Below, the Jaakkola
RL algorithm is summarized. See [32] for further details.
The following steps are followed to obtain the driver policies
using Jaakkola RL:
Step 1. Evaluate the value function for the mes-
sages V (m|pit) and Q-values for the message-action pairs
Q(m, a|pit) associated with the driver policy pi at step t, using
the following equations:
βtm(m) =(1−
χtm(m)
Ktm(m)
)γ(t)βt−1m (m) +
χtm(m)
Ktm(m)
,
V (m|pit) =(1− χ
t
m(m)
Ktm(m)
)V (m|pit−1)
+ βtm(m)[R
t − R¯(pit)],
βta(m, a) =(1−
χta(m, a)
Kta(m, a)
)γ(t)βt−1a (m, a) +
χta(m, a)
Kta(m, a)
,
Q(m, a|pit) =(1− χ
t
a(m, a)
Kta(m, a)
)Q(m, a|pit−1)
+ βta(m, a)[R
t − R¯(pit)], (7)
where m and a designate “messages” (observations) and
actions, respectively, the superscript t refers to the time step,
while the subscript (m or a) indicates whether the function is
associated with messages or with message-action pairs. The
function χ is an indicator function, taking the value 1 if
the message/message-action pair is visited and 0 otherwise.
The function K represents the number of times a particular
message/message-action pair is visited. The positive sequence
γ(t) represents a discount factor and is converging to 1 in the
limit as t→∞. The Rt is the reward obtained at the current
time instant t, while R¯(pit) is the average reward associated
with the policy pit, i.e., if this policy were executed for an
infinite time [33].
In the implementation of the above algorithm, the true
average reward R¯(pit) is replaced with an estimate, which is
computed as an average reward over a past window, making
use of the fact that the policy is slowly varying in time.
Step 2. Update the driver policy pi, which is a probabilistic
mapping from observations (messages) to actions, using the
following equation:
pit+1(a|m) = (1− ε)pit(a|m) + εpˆit(a|m), (8)
where 0 < ε < 1 is the learning rate and pˆit is chosen such
that J(m|pˆit) = max
a
(
Q(m, a|pit)−V (m|pit)). For any policy
pi(a|m), J(m|pi) is defined as:
J(m|pi) =
∑
a
pi(a|m)(Q(m, a|pi)− V (m|pi)). (9)
Note that based on the process defined above, pˆit should be
defined in such a way that it has probability 1 for picking the
action a that has the highest Q(m, a|pit) value and probability
0 for picking the other actions.
Going through step 1 and 2 at each time t, the driver model,
or the converged policy, denoted by pi∗, is obtained once the
policy converges during the iterative process. The convergence
criterion is based on the convergence of the average reward,
i.e., change in the average reward within a given number of
steps less than a tolerance in absolute value.
C. The role of hierarchical decision making in obtaining
driver policies
The process of obtaining driver policies is called “training,”
where the trained driver is a learner and the other vehicles
and automation constitute the environment. During the training
process, the model of the environment is needed to obtain state
transitions as a result of driver actions, where the hierarchical
decision making approach plays a crucial rule: for the training
of a level-k driver policy, all of the traffic but the trained
driver are assigned level-(k-1) policies. The process starts
with the determination of a level-0 policy (see Section III-A),
which represents the lowest level where the drivers do not
consider interaction with other drivers and do not explicitly
take into account their possible actions. Once a level-0 policy
is determined, the RL algorithm is run by assigning level-0
policies to all of the vehicles except the one that is being
trained. At the end of the training process, a level-1 policy
is obtained. Similarly, while training a level-2 policy, all of
the vehicles but the trained vehicle are assigned a level-1
policy. This hierarchical assignment continues until the desired
highest level is obtained. In experimental studies [30], it is
shown that in human interactions, level-3 players are very
rarely encountered and therefore in our results we trained
policies up to and including level-2.
IV. AUTONOMOUS DRIVING CONTROL APPROACHES
The proposed traffic model has been employed to build a
simulator to test and evaluate the performance of autonomous
driving control algorithms. As specific examples, two au-
tonomous driving approaches, based on Stackelberg policies
and decision trees, will be evaluated and compared, using a
simulator in which the traffic, other than the controlled vehicle,
consists of drivers modeled using our game theoretic policies.
In this section, the control algorithms that will be tested are
briefly explained and in the next section simulation evaluations
are provided.
The Stackelberg policies and the decision tree policies that
are compared in this study were originally developed in [10],
[15] and [16]. Since these policies were developed under
assumptions representing a simpler traffic environment, some
necessary modifications were made to let the autonomous
vehicle, which will employ these policies, be able to operate in
the traffic environment investigated in this study. For example,
the originally proposed Stackelberg and decision tree policies
consider only lane change actions. To make them more com-
patible with the test environment, acceleration/deceleration
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actions are added to their action space. Fig. 2 shows the
necessity of this modification, where each rectangle represents
a car and the arrows represent both the driving direction and
velocity (the longer the arrow, the larger the velocity). In the
figure, three yellow cars are in front of the red test car and
since the speed of the test car is larger than that of the yellow
cars, there is a danger of collision that cannot be resolved only
with a lane change.
Fig. 2: No solution for the red car by only changing lanes.
A. Stackelberg policies
To generate Stackelberg policies for the autonomous ve-
hicle, we consider three vehicles as players, and the rest of
the vehicles are considered to be the environment. The three
players are assigned roles as the “leader,” “first follower,” and
“second follower,” and they choose their actions sequentially:
the leader chooses its action first, followed by the first fol-
lower, and, finally, the second follower. Each player evaluates
their actions according to a utility function that consists of two
parts. The first part, known as the positive utility, is defined
as follows:
Upos =
{
min(d4, dv), if there is a vehicle ahead,
dv, otherwise,
(10)
where d4 is the distance to the car directly in front, i.e., the
headway distance, and dv is the maximum visibility distance.
The second part of the utility is known as the negative utility:
Uneg = d∇ − vrT − dmin, (11)
where d∇ and vr are the distance to and the relative velocity
of the car immediately behind, T is a prediction time window,
and dmin is the minimum distance required to allow a lane
change; here, dmin is set to the car safe zone length. Thus,
overtaking vehicles are taken into consideration, and lane
changes that cut off overtaking vehicles are discouraged.
The actions chosen by the leader, first follower, and second
follower, denoted by γ`, γf1, and γf2, respectively, are the
Stackelberg Equilibrium actions; i.e., the leader chooses its
actions to maximize its utility for the worst-case actions that
the two followers might choose. Thus, the leader chooses:
γ∗` = max
γ`
min
γf1
min
γf2
[
U ′pos + U
′
neg
]
, (12)
where U ′pos and U
′
neg are the utilities that correspond to
a specific set of actions {γ`, γf1, γf2}. The two followers
maximize their own utilities with the known choice of γ`.
In this paper, when constructing Stackelberg policies, the
controlled vehicle is the leader, and the two cars immediately
behind are the followers. An alternative choice in which the
controlled vehicle is one of the followers instead of the leader
can be treated similarly.
It is noted that in [15] and [16] vehicle dynamics are
different than the ones used in this paper. Furthermore, some
aspects of the modeling such as uncertainties in measuring
distance, side-viewing and response delays that are considered
in these references are omitted here to simplify the analysis
but can be easily integrated.
B. Decision tree policies
In the decision tree approach to autonomous driving, the ve-
hicle’s actions are determined by a path planner that evaluates
a specified number of pre-selected action profiles by building
a tree of potential action sequences and evaluating each branch
according to a specified metric.
To left
Accel.
...
To right
To left
Accel.
...
To right
1st layer
2nd layer
0→ x
Fig. 3: Decision tree diagram. The black arrows show the
relative velocities of the yellow cars with respect to the red
test car.
In this paper, the decision tree consists of two layers, where
each layer allows the seven actions listed in Section II-C. Thus,
the action profiles consist of two actions each, and 49 profiles
are evaluated. The evaluation metric is based on the reward
function (2), which is also used for the training of the level-
k policies. In particular, the total reward is calculated as a
weighted sum of the rewards obtained from the two layers:
Rtotal = wl1Rl1 + wl2Rl2, (13)
where wl1, wl2 ∈ R+ are the weighting terms. The car
applies the first-layer action of the profile that has the highest
total reward among all profiles, and repeats this procedure at
each step. When evaluating the action profiles, the controlled
vehicle assumes that all other vehicles would apply the action
“maintain” during the prediction horizon.
In [10], it was assumed that the environment evolves de-
terministically over a planning horizon, independently of the
controlled vehicle’s actions. However, in our simulator, not
only the controlled vehicle responds to the traffic, but also the
traffic responds to the controlled vehicle’s actions.
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C. Path planner triggering threshold
Both the Stackelberg and the decision tree policies are
used as path planners and triggered only when necessary and
beneficial. When the policies are not triggered, the vehicle
follows a predefined driving pattern. More specifically, with
the help of Fig. 4, the driving algorithm can be explained as
follows:
Car
left middle right
A
B
xA = 42[m]
xB = 21[m]
Fig. 4: Triggering threshold.
1) “Accelerate,” if there are no other cars in region A,
2) Path planner is triggered, if there are cars in region A,
but no cars in region B,
3) “Safe Mode,” which in this paper is the same as the
level-0 policy, is applied if there are cars in region B.
It is clear that if there are no cars in region A, the
autonomous vehicle may accelerate safely, while if there
are cars in region B, the autonomous vehicle is supposed
to decelerate to keep a reasonable headway distance. The
activation logic is designed 1) to increase the safety, and 2)
to reduce the computational cost by preventing unnecessary
action evaluations. In particular, region A is designed to cover
the center of adjacent lanes, while region B is designed to
cover the boundary lines of the current lane, so that when
some vehicle in the vicinity is changing lanes into the test
vehicle’s lane, the test vehicle becomes aware of it before the
other vehicle actually enters its lane.
V. RESULTS
A. Environment and set-up
We model the environment as follows. The width of a lane
is 3.6[m], and the safe zones around the cars, which should
not be violated, are modeled as 6[m] × 2[m] boxes. Cars
always drive at the center of a lane unless they are changing
lanes. Cars only accelerate or decelerate at ±a1 = ±2.5[m/s2]
or ±a2 = ±5[m/s2], and lane changes occur with constant
lateral velocity such that the total time to change lanes is tcl =
2[s]. During lane changes, the longitudinal velocity remains
constant and once a lane change begins, it always continues
to completion. The longitudinal axis is called x, and its origin
is collocated with the car that is to be trained or evaluated.
To configure the simulation, the following values need to
be specified:
1) the number of lanes, n`,
2) the number of cars, nc,
3) the maximum allowable initialization distance, x0max,
4) the simulation duration, tf .
The following procedure is employed to initialize a simula-
tion: A car is assigned to a lane that is determined randomly
based on the uniform distribution. The specific location of
the car within the assigned lane is determined randomly
based on the uniform distribution in [−x0max, x0max]. Then, the
initial longitudinal velocity of the car is given randomly based
on the uniform distribution within the range [vmin, vmax] =
[62, 98][km/h]. The initial action is set as “maintain.” The
car is then assigned a policy to follow (level-0, 1, or 2).
This process is repeated until all cars are configured. While
locating each car, it is required that the minimum initial
distance between the cars be 30[m]. Once the initialization
is completed, the simulation is run according to Algorithm 1
given below.
1 t = 0.
2 while t < tf do
3 foreach car do
4 Obtain observations from the environment.
5 Given the observations, determine an action
based on assigned policy.
6 Given the action, update position and velocity.
7 end
8 if training a policy then
9 Evaluate reward function for trainee.
10 Update value function.
11 end
12 if trainee/test vehicle is in a constraint violation state
then
13 End the simulation.
14 end
15 t = t+ ∆t.
16 end
Algorithm 1: Single Episode Simulation
Five cars are observable by the test vehicle, as described
in Section II-B, and a car is considered “close” if its relative
longitudinal position satisfies |xr| ≤ dc = 21[m], “nominal”
if dc < |xr| ≤ df = 42[m], and “far” if df < |xr| ≤
dv = 63[m], where dv is the maximum visibility distance.
Cars farther away than dv[m] are considered to be out of
visual range and unobservable. If no car can be observed in a
position, this is considered equivalent to a car that is “far”
and “moving away.” Note that dc = 21[m] is determined
by considering the minimum distance needed for a car to
safely avoid a distance constraint violation by braking with the
maximum allowable deceleration in the worst case scenario
where a car in front is approaching with maximum relative
speed and entering the “close” range.
Fig. 5 shows a snapshot of an example simulation setup with
three lanes. The rectangles represent the safe zones around the
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close
nominal
far
3
2
1
0→ x
Fig. 5: Simulation environment.
cars, and the arrows attached to the rectangles show the relative
velocities of the cars with respect to the test vehicle, that is
located in the center lane at x = 0. Specific observations by
the test vehicle are given as follows:
• Front left: close, moving away,
• Front center: far, moving away,
• Front right: far, approaching,
• Rear left: nominal, approaching,
• Rear right: nominal, stable,
• Lane index: lane 2.
Note that two cars in Fig. 5 are unobservable: The car in
the front center position is beyond the visual range – so the
corresponding observed status is “moving away” even though
the car is actually “stable;” and the car in the rear right “far”
position is hidden by the car in the rear right “nominal”
position. These limitations in the observation space reflect the
POMDP nature of the problem, as discussed previously.
B. Level-0 driver behavior
In this section, we present simulation results to show the
driving behavior of a level-0 car. Furthermore, we present the
simulator user interface.
In Fig. 6, the red car in the center is the trainee/test vehicle,
while the yellow cars make up the traffic environment. The red
arrow in front of the red car indicates its travel direction, and
arrow size indicates how fast the car is traveling. The panel on
the left is a speedometer, and the steering wheel on the right
indicates the lateral motion of the car. The green box and
red box in the middle indicate the gas pedal and the brake
pedal, respectively, and when any of them turns blue, that
indicates the pedal is pressed. The coordinate axis is fixed on
the test car and the motions of the other cars can be tracked by
their relative distance to the red car. In Fig. 6(a), a yellow car
directly in front of the red car (“far”) is “approaching” because
the red car is faster. At this moment neither the gas pedal nor
the brake pedal is pressed. In Fig. 6(b), the yellow car enters
the “nominal” range, and consistently with the level-0 policy,
the red car brakes and decreases its speed. In Fig. 6(c), the red
car gets to a lower speed, and the yellow car is now “stable.”
C. Training process
When training a new policy, the observation value function,
V , for observed message m, and the action value function, Q,
(a)
40[s]
(b)
42[s]
(c)
44[s]
Fig. 6: Level-0 simulation results: Plots (a)-(c) show snapshots
of the simulation at 40[s], 42[s] and 44[s], respectively.
for message-action pair (m, a), are initialized as follows:
∀m, V (m) = 0;
∀m,∀a, Q(m, a) = 0. (14)
For each observation, the actions are assigned equal prob-
ability of selection at initialization, and during each policy
improvement step, if
max
a
Q(m, a) > V (m), (15)
then 0.01 is added to the probability of selecting
argmaxaQ(m, a), after which the action probabilities are
normalized.
The observation space described in Section II-B has 311
different observations. In order to ensure that the learning
algorithm is exposed to a large portion of the observation
space, the trainee needs to be exposed to both sparse and dense
traffic environments. Therefore, during training, the number
of cars in the environment is selected randomly, based on the
uniform distribution, where 0 ≤ nc ≤ nmaxc . The maximum
number of cars, nmaxc , is chosen based on the number of lanes
and x0max, such that if n
max
c cars are placed in the environment,
the road is near full capacity.
Finally, after sufficient training time, the level-0 policy
is assigned to the observations (messages) that are still not
visited enough during training, so that conservative actions
are performed in such rarely encountered cases.
Training then proceeds according to Algorithm 2, given
below:
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY 9
1 step=0;
2 while step < desired training cycles do
3 Randomly select nc ∈ [0, nmaxc ].
4 Initialize all cars with level-(k-1) policies.
5 Evaluate the level-k policy using Algorithm 1.
6 Improve the policy.
7 step=step+1.
8 end
9 Assign level-0 policy to the not well trained cases.
Algorithm 2: Training Process
Fig. 7 shows the evolution of the average reward during
level-1 and level-2 trainings. The reward function weights are
chosen as: w1 = 10000, w2 = 5, w3 = w4 = 1.
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Fig. 7: Average rewards: (a) Training for level-1. (b) Training
for level-2.
D. Level-k driver interactions
We first present simulation results to show the driving be-
havior of a level-1 car in a level-0 traffic environment (Fig. 8),
and then of a level-2 car in a level-1 traffic environment
(Fig. 9). It is noted that in both figures, the traffic is moving
towards the right. The test vehicle is red and the rest of the
vehicles are yellow.
In Fig. 8(a), the car directly in front of the test vehicle is
“approaching” with a large relative speed and enters the “far”
distance range. In Fig. 8(b), the red car decelerates and begins
to steer. In Fig. 8(c), the red car starts to move into the lane
on its left. In Fig. 8(d), the lane changing is completed, after
2[s]; while another car in front approaches the red car. In
Fig. 8(e), the red car decelerates until being able to keep a
stable headway, which is shown in Fig. 8(f). All these actions
represent a reasonable driving behavior.
Similarly, Fig. 9 shows a simulation result of a level-2 car
in a level-1 traffic environment. In Fig. 9(a), the yellow car in
the middle lane is “approaching” the red car, while the yellow
car in the left lane is “moving away,” so the red car decides
to change lane to the left. In Fig. 9(b), the yellow car in the
middle lane starts to change lane to the left, so the red car
needs to brake. In Fig. 9(c), there is no car directly in front
of the red car, in which case a level-1 car would accelerate.
However, because the longitudinal distance of the red car to
the yellow car in the middle lane is too small and the red car
(a)
178[s]
(b)
179[s]
(c)
180[s]
(d)
181[s]
(e)
184[s]
(f)
188[s]
Fig. 8: Level-1 vs. level-0 simulation results: Plots (a)-(f) show
snapshots of the simulation at 178[s], 179[s], 180[s], 181[s],
184[s], 188[s], respectively.
has no confidence that the yellow car won’t change lane to the
left, in which case the red car’s acceleration would lead to a
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distance constraint violation, the red car decides to maintain its
current speed. In Fig. 9(d), there is a car in the traffic moving
into the red car’s lane, which forces the red car to decelerate.
(a)
60[s]
(b)
66[s]
(c)
79[s]
(d)
80[s]
Fig. 9: Level-2 vs. level-1 simulation results: Plots (a)-(d) show
snapshots of the simulation at 60[s], 66[s], 79[s] and 80[s],
respectively.
Different driving patterns of level-1 and level-2 cars, in sim-
ilar situations, reflect different levels of reasoning in decision
making. It is noted that in Fig. 9, the cars in the environment
(in yellow) also change lanes, unlike the ones in Fig. 8,
because their actions are based on the level-1 policy, which
makes them react to their own surroundings.
Fig. 10 shows the constraint violation rates of the level-1
and level-2 test cars for varying numbers of cars in the traffic.
Here, “constraint violation” refers to the violation of the safe
zone of the test car by any of the vehicles in the simulations.
To obtain these rates, 10,000 simulations are run for each case
(i.e., for each value of the number of cars). Each simulation
lasts 200 seconds and the rates are provided as the percentage
of simulation runs during which safe zones are violated. Note
that the level-2 test car is placed in traffic of level-1 vehicles,
and the level-1 car is placed in the environment of level-0
vehicles. It is seen that the level-2 test car experiences higher
violation rates than the level-1 test car. One explanation for
this is that the traffic flow consisting of level-1 cars, where the
level-2 policy is evaluated, is much harder to predict compared
to the one consisting of level-0 cars, where the level-1 policy
is tested.
0 10 20 30
Number of cars
0
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
R
at
e
Level1 vs Level0
Level2 vs Level1
Fig. 10: Constraint violation rates of the level-1 and level-2
policies.
E. A comparative quantitative evaluation of Stackelberg and
decision tree policies
At first, we test the Stackelberg and the decision tree policies
in a traffic consisting of only level-0 vehicles. A defining
feature of the level-0 policy is that the vehicles do not change
lanes. It is observed that both the Stackelberg and the decision
tree policies perform well in this environment, i.e., constraint
violations are not observed. This is also in agreement with the
results in [15], [16] and [10]. The figures are omitted as they
provide no additional information.
Next, we consider a simulated traffic environment where
10% of the drivers make decisions based on level-0 policies,
60% of the drivers act based on level-1 policies and 30%
use level-2 policies. These percentages of various levels are
assumed based on an experimental study conducted in [30].
Fig. 11 shows the distance constraint violation rates for the
Stackelberg and decision tree policies vs. the number of cars
in the traffic. Each simulation is 200 seconds long, and 10,000
simulations are run for each case (i.e., for each value of the
number of cars).
As seen in Fig. 11, both approaches exhibit significant
distance constraint violation percentages. Note that these vi-
olations could also be caused by our level-k drivers, but as
shown in Fig. 10, compared to the numbers in Fig. 11, the
constraint violation rates of the level-k policies are small.
The main reason for the distance constraint violations is
that the developed traffic model with interacting drivers is
more complex than the traffic models used for the development
of the Stackelberg and decision tree algorithms. To the best
of our knowledge, few works addressing the development of
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Fig. 11: Constraint violation rates of the Stackelberg and
decision tree policies.
autonomous vehicle control policies consider traffic of similar
complexity.
Fig. 12 shows two cases of driver interactions that are
responsible for many distance constraint violations. The red
rectangle indicates the car being tested, while the yellow
rectangles are the cars in the traffic environment. The black
arrows indicate the longitudinal velocities of the cars, while
green arrows indicate the lateral velocities. The left hand side
presents the scenarios at time t, while the right hand side
presents the scenarios at time t + 1. In Fig. 12(a), the red
car is starting to change lane to the left, trying to overtake
the front car, while at the same time the front car is also
starting to change lane because of some other car ahead of it
(not shown in this figure). As a result, both cars are changing
lanes while their longitudinal distance keeps decreasing until
below the safe distance constraint. Although the red car may
brake hard after the lane change, trying to avoid a distance
constraint violation, at that time its range is already too small
for it to avoid that by braking. In Fig. 12(b), the red car is
starting to change lane to the left to overtake the car in front
of it. Although the car in front remains in its own lane, there
is some other car in the leftmost lane starting to move into
the middle lane as well. As a result, both the red car and
the yellow car in the leftmost lane are changing lanes to the
middle and eventually violate the safe distance between them.
We note that challenging scenarios as the ones above can
greatly facilitate the testing of autonomous driving control
algorithms. In fact, the above two cases are also dangerous sit-
uations for a human driver. Many traffic accidents result from
the driver misjudging the potential actions of the surrounding
vehicles.
Note also that the constraint violation rate first increases and
then decreases as the number of cars in the environment, which
reflects the traffic density, increases. As Fig. 13 shows, when
the traffic is very sparse, cars on the road can drive almost
freely and have low chance of having a constraint violation
( 1©). As the number of cars in the traffic increases, the chance
of experiencing an incident also increases ( 2©) (until a peak
(a)
(b)
Fig. 12: Scenarios for distance constraint violation.
3©). When the traffic becomes very dense, for instance, in a
traffic jam, the average traveling speed becomes low, and at
the same time each car mostly stays in its own lane and has
few lane change maneuvers. As a result, the probability of
having constraint violations becomes low again ( 4©).
Rate
Traffic density1©
2©
3©
4©
Fig. 13: Diagram of constraint violation rate.
Apart from using the constraint violation rate as a metric
to measure the safety and robustness of the Stackelberg
and decision tree policies, we also use the average travel
speed to measure the driving performance. It can be observed
from Fig. 14 that the decision tree policy has better driving
performance compared to the Stackelberg policy.
Fig. 15 compares the computational load of the two au-
tonomous driving control methods. The numbers shown in
the plot are the average time consumed to run the 200[s]
simulation. Because the decision tree policy needs to evaluate
49 profiles of 2-layer actions in total, its required computation
load is higher than that of the Stackelberg policy. As a
summary, our implementation of the decision tree algorithm
is better than our implementation of the Stackelberg algorithm
in terms of both safety and performance, while the price paid
is the higher computational cost. The numbers in Fig. 15 are
obtained using the Java System.nanoT ime() function, and
the simulations are run on a desktop with i7-4790 3.60GHz
CPU and with Eclipse Java Neon platform. Note also that as
Fig. 15 indicates the simulator is quite fast.
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Fig. 14: Average traveling speed of the Stackelberg and
decision tree policies.
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Fig. 15: Computational time of the Stackelberg and decision
tree policies.
F. Optimal autonomous driving controller calibration
One of the potential uses of the proposed traffic modeling
approach is for calibrating parameter values in the autonomous
driving control algorithms. We illustrate this using the decision
tree policy as an example.
The optimization objective is defined by considering both
safety and performance: the goal is to maximize the following
reward function:
Robj = p1(−c¯) + p2 v¯x − vmin
vmax − vmin , (16)
where the weights p1 and p2 are determined by the user, c¯
is the constraint violation rate defined as in Fig. 11, v¯x is
the average speed during the 200[s]-simulations, and vmin
and vmax are the lower and the upper bounds of the test
vehicle’s speed, respectively. Note that this reward function
is designed such that each of its terms is dimensionless.
The parameters optimized in this example are the ratio wl1wl2 ,
representing the weighting of the two layers in the evaluation
metric function (13) in the decision tree evaluations, and
xB , the size of region B in the longitudinal direction – a
threshold of triggering the path planner. These two parameters
are selected for optimization since they have indirect influence
on safety and performance, making them difficult to set from
intuition. Note that the influence of other parameters, for
example, w1, · · · , w4, in the decision tree evaluation metric
function, is more intuitive and they can be tuned more easily.
Fig. 16 shows the surface of the reward values as a function
of wl1wl2 , xB corresponding to different weight selections p1, p2,
in the presence of a 20-car traffic. These figures can be used to
pick the best pair of (wl1wl2 , xB) for a given reward function. For
example, for maximum safety (p1 = 1, p2 = 0), Fig. 16(a)
shows that the best pair is (2.5, 23). The rate of constraint
violation with this pair is 27.5%; while for the original
selection (2, 21) in the previous section, the corresponding
violation rate is 31.8%.
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xB
Robj Robj
Robj Robj
Fig. 16: Parameter optimization results corresponding to dif-
ferent reward function designs. (a) p1=1, p2=0, (b) p1=0, p2=1,
(c) p1=0.7, p2=0.3, (d) p1=0.6, p2=0.4.
VI. SUMMARY
In this paper, a hierarchical reasoning game theory based
approach to model interacting driver behavior in traffic was
presented. The proposed method provides an approach to
simulate interactive driver behavior under the given traffic
conditions.
A traffic simulator was developed using level-k driver
models. It can be used for testing and verification of au-
tonomous driving algorithms, and for discovery of challenging
trajectories and scenarios that can facilitate the testing of future
autonomous vehicles. To illustrate the simulator use, we have
defined and tested two autonomous vehicle control policies
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in terms of safety and performance. Our traffic simulator can
also be used for parameter calibration of these policies by a
simulation-based optimization approach.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Campbell, M. Egerstedt, J. P. How, and R. M. Murray, “Autonomous
driving in urban environments: approaches, lessons and challenges,”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A: Math-
ematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, vol. 368, no. 1928, pp.
4649–4672, 2010.
[2] J. M. Anderson, N. Kalra, K. D. Stanley, P. Sorensen, C. Samaras,
and O. A. Oluwatola, “Autonomous vehicle technology: A guide for
policymakers,” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, Research Re-
port, 2016. Available at http:www.rand.orgpubsresearch reportsRR443-
2.html.
[3] N. Kalra. (2016, Feb. 01), “Australian innovation,” [Weblog en-
try], THERANDBLOG, Available: http:www.rand.orgblog201602with-
driverless-cars-how-safe-is-safe-enough.html [Apr 03, 2016].
[4] T. Wongpiromsarn and R. M. Murray, “Formal verification of an
autonomous vehicle system,” in Conference on Decision and Control,
May, 2008.
[5] T. Wongpiromsarn, S. Mitra, R. M. Murray, and A. Lamperski, “Pe-
riodically controlled hybrid systems: Verifying a controller for an
autonomous vehicle,” in Proceedings of the HSCC: Hybrid Systems,
Computation and Control Conference. California Institute of Technol-
ogy, 2008.
[6] J. Lygeros, D. N. Godbole, and S. Sastry, “Verified hybrid controllers for
automated vehicles,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 43,
no. 4, pp. 522–539, 1998.
[7] M. Althoff and J. M. Dolan, “Online verification of automated road
vehicles using reachability analysis,” IEEE Transactions on Robotics,
vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 903–918, 2014.
[8] A. Carvalho, S. Lefevre, G. Schildbach, J. Kong, and F. Borrelli,
“Automated driving: The role of forecasts and uncertainty-a control
perspective,” European Journal of Control, vol. 24, pp. 14–32, 2015.
[9] I. Miller, M. Campbell, D. Huttenlocher, F.-R. Kline, A. Nathan,
S. Lupashin, J. Catlin, B. Schimpf, P. Moran, N. Zych, E. Garcia,
M. Kurdziel, and H. Fujishima, “Team cornell’s skynet: Robust percep-
tion and planning in an urban environment,” Journal of Field Robotics,
vol. 25, no. 8, pp. 493–527, 2008.
[10] L. Claussman, A. Carvalho, and G. Schildbach, “A path planner for
autonomous driving on highway human mimicry approach with binary
decision diagrams,” in Proceedings of the European Control Conference,
Linz, Austria, July 2015.
[11] S. Brechtel, T. Gindele, and R. Dillmann, “Probabilistic decision-making
under uncertainty for autonomous driving using continuous pomdps,” in
Proc. IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC), October 2014,
pp. 392–399.
[12] E. Galceran, A. G. Cunnigham, R. M. Eustice, and E. Olson, “Multi-
policy decision-making for autonomous driving via changepoint-based
behavior prediction,” in Proceedings of Robotics: Science and Systems,
Rome, Italy, 2015.
[13] P. Falcone, F. Borrelli, J. Asgari, H. E. Tseng, and D. Hrovat, “Predictive
active steering control for autonomous vehicle systems,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Control Systems Technology, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 566–580,
2007.
[14] A. Carvalho, Y. Gao, A. Gray, H. E. Tseng, and F. Borrelli, “Predictive
control of an autonomous ground vehicle using linearization approach,”
in Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Annual Conference on Intelligent
Transportation Systems, The Hague, The Netherlands, October 2013.
[15] J. H. Yoo and R. Langari, “Stackelberg game based model of highway
driving,” in Proc. ASME Dynamic Systems and Control Conference joint
with JSME Motion and Vibration Conference, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
Oct. 2012.
[16] ——, “A stackelberg game theoretic driver model for merging,” in Proc.
ASME Dynamic Systems and Control Conference, Palo Alto, California,
Oct. 2013.
[17] S. Lefevre, Y. Gao, D. Vasquez, E. Tseng, R. Bajcsy, and F. Borrelli,
“Lane keeping assistance with learning-based driver model and model
predictive control,” in Proceedings of the 12th international symposium
on advanced vehicle control, 2014.
[18] S. Lefevre, A. Carvalho, and F. Borrelli, “Autonomous car following:
A learning-based approach,” in IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium,
2015, pp. 920–926.
[19] R. Vasudevan, V. Shia, Y. Gao, R. Cervera-Navarro, R. Bajcsy, and
F. Borrelli, “Safe semi-autonomous control with enhanced driver mod-
eling,” in Proc. Amer. Control Conf., 2012, pp. 2896–2903.
[20] V. Shia, Y. Gao, R. Vasudevan, K. D. Campbell, T. Lin, F. Borrelli, and
R. Bajcsy, “Semiautonomous vehicular control using driver modeling,”
IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, vol. 15, no. 6,
pp. 2696–2709, 2014.
[21] D. Salvucci, E. Boer, and A. Liu., “Toward an integrated model of driver
behavior in cognitive architecture,” Transportation Research Record:
Journal of the Transportation Research Board, vol. 1779, pp. 9–16,
2001.
[22] P. Hidas, “Modelling lane changing and merging in microscopic traffic
simulation,” Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies,
vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 351–371, 2002.
[23] R. Lee and D. Wolpert, Chapter: Game theoretic modeling of pilot
behavior during mid-air encounters. in Decision making with multiple
imperfect decision makers. Intelligent Systems Reference Library Series.
Springer, 2011.
[24] S. Backhaus, R. Bent, J. Bono, R. Lee, B. Tracey, D. Wolpert, D. Xie,
and Y. Yildiz, “Cyber-physical security: A game theory model of humans
interacting over control systems,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,
vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 2320–2327, 2013.
[25] C. Dextreit and I. V. Kolmanovsky, “Game theory controller for hybrid
electric vehicles,” IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology,
vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 652–663, 2014.
[26] Y. Yildiz, A. Agogino, and G. Brat, “Predicting pilot behavior in
medium-scale scenarios using game theory and reinforcement learning,”
Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 1335–
1343, 2014.
[27] D. Oyler, Y. Yildiz, A. Girard, N. I. Li, and I. Kolmanovsky, “A game
theoretical model of traffic with multiple interacting drivers for use in
autonomous vehicle development,” in Proc. Amer. Control Conf., Boston,
MA, 2016.
[28] N. Li, D. Oyler, M. Zhang, Y. Yildiz, A. Girard, and I. Kolmanovsky,
“Hierarchical reasoning game theory based approach for evaluation and
testing of autonomous vehicle control systems,” in IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control, Las Vegas, accepted for publication, 2016.
[29] D. Stahl and P. Wilson, “On players models of other players: Theory
and experimental evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 10,
no. 1, p. 218254, 1995.
[30] M. A. Costa-Gomes, V. P. Crawford, and N. Iriberri, “Comparing models
of strategic thinking in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil’s coordination
games,” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 7, no. 2-3,
pp. 365–376, 2009.
[31] R. S. Sutton and A. G. Barto, Reinforcement learning: An introduction.
Cambridge: MIT press, 1998.
[32] T. Jaakkola, P. S. Satinder, and I. Jordan., “Reinforcement learning
algorithm for partially observable markov decision problems,” Advances
in Neural Information Processing Systems 7: Proceedings of the 1994
Conference, 1994.
[33] S. Mahadevan, “Average reward reinforcement learning: Foundations,
algorithms, and empirical results,” Machine learning, vol. 22, no. 1-3,
pp. 159–195, 1996.
